The Spanish road

By William S. Lind
web posted February 24, 2003

John Boyd defined strategy as the art of connecting yourself to
as many other power centers as possible while isolating your
enemy from as many other power centers as possible. By that
definition, Saddam Hussein appears to be a better strategist than
the Bush Administration. Since the U.N. weapons inspectors
renewed their work in Iraq, Saddam has managed to forge de
facto alliances against war with France, Germany and Russia. He
appears to be developing a positive connection with the
inspectors themselves, with the U.N., and possibly with a
majority of members of the U.N. Security Council. In contrast,
the Administration in Washington has isolated itself from several
of its oldest allies, provoked a serious split in NATO, and left
itself very much on the defensive in the face of an inspections
process that continues to find no Weapons of Mass Destruction
in Iraq -- and thus no causus belli for the U.S.

Is this simply ineptitude, or is something larger going on here? I
suggest the latter. For some time, elements in the Administration
have been looking far beyond Iraq. They have spoken with
increasing openness about re-making the entire Middle East,
installing "democratic" governments that would be friendly not
only to the United States but to Israel (I put "democratic" in
quotes because genuinely democratic elections in most Middle
Eastern countries would put radical Islamist regimes in power,
which is not the outcome the new Wilsonians have in mind).
America is to become not just "the only superpower" but a
"hyperpower" which no one can hope to resist. China is to be
cowed by an arms race she cannot afford; non-state elements
will fall to American Special Forces; the U.N. will be a tool of
American world dominance. America will be the new Britain,
perhaps the new Rome.

Or, more likely, the new Spain. The Spanish analogy is not one
most Americans will know, nor one the new Wilsonians will
much care for. But it may prove apt.

The quest to create the "universal monarchy," which was the
earlier term for "the only superpower," began in earnest with the
Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, the father of King Philip II of
Spain. Charles ruled virtually all of Europe, except France. His
kingdoms included Spain, which had the first true world empire.
Fueled with the gold and silver of the New World and
possessing an army so successful that it went unbeaten for more
than a century, Spain offered Charles and then Philip the
potential of ruling the world. You may recall that Armada
business, when King Philip decided to end the impudence of an
upstart island, England, and its Protestant queen, Elizabeth I.
That did not go quite according to plan -- somewhat like our
current business in Afghanistan -- but no matter; so rich was
Spain that when the Armada was destroyed, Philip just built
another one.

What finally stopped Hapsburg Spain and, later, France under
Louis XIV and Napoleon and Germany under Hitler from
establishing the universal monarchy was a fundamental
characteristic of the international state system: whenever one
nation attempts to attain world dominance, it pushes everyone
else into a coalition against it. That dynamic, not any love for
Saddam, is what is behind German and French opposition to the
Bush Administration's plan for war with Iraq. That is what is
drawing others, including Russia, into supporting the French and
the Germans. The Dutch ambassador to the United States was
recently quoted in the Washington Post as saying he is
concerned about a "monopoly of power without checks and
balances. Self-assertiveness and an arrogance of power, that is a
troubling thing."

In fact, the Dutch ambassador is wrong: there are checks and
balances, and we are now seeing them start to work. The failure
of American strategy, and America's growing self-isolation, are
guaranteed so long as Washington aspires to world hegemony.
The very nature of the international state system assures our
quest for universal monarchy will fail, the same way all have
failed. And our "unbeatable" military will find itself beaten, just as
the Spanish army was beaten at Rocroi, by someone it thought
would be a pushover.
 
The real question is not whether the American drive for world
hegemony will succeed; it will not. The question is why we are
attempting it in the first place.

William S. Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural
Conservatism.

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