In defense of constitutional monarchy as form of government
By J.K. Baltzersen
web posted April 20, 2026
Preface
This opinion piece in its original appeared in the magazine of the European Democrat Students, Bullseye, issue # 16/17 for August 2000, pre-released for the EDS Summer University in July in Poland. A PDF of that issue was available at an earlier version of the EDS website. A series of back issues is currently available, but some are missing, including # 16/17.
Most people nowadays when they encounter the term constitutional monarchy, they think of a monarchy where the monarch does not intervene in politics. The term does have a broader definition. My defense of constitutional monarchy in this piece is mostly about defending constitutional monarchy more towards the executive-monarchy end of the scale, and to a lesser extent about defending the “Bagehot rights” of the monarch, namely the rights to be consulted, to warn, and to encourage, especially the former two.
My thinking on monarchy and democracy has evolved since the original publication. It is in particular notable that I wrote this piece originally before I became familiar with the Austrian monarchist Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and the monarchy-is-better-than-democracy thinking of Hans-Hermann Hoppe. I would not with my present thinking on monarchy suggest that a head of state being born into his position is disadvantageous. Nor would I take the revolutionaries’ side on the issue of George III, but it remains a fact that he is a historical example of a monarch being removed as monarch of a given geographical territory. In the article, I use the term guarantee. Strictly speaking, there are few guarantees in matters of government. I would rephrase those uses today.
The story of the seat belt regulations and King Olav is a story retold by members of the Cabinet at the time. It comes in different versions. Reportedly, the King had read about it in the news, and he asked the members of the Council of State about it. When the bill was submitted to the Council of State for formal approval before becoming a bill in Parliament, it passed without royal comment. Later, the King reportedly got a formal exemption from the police. This remains well known among those knowledgeable in these kinds of matters, although not all the details. There are, of course, facts that are much more publicly known.
As for the constitutional convention of the King always accepting the advice of the Council, this is also backed up by a constitutional amendment in 1911, where the so-called countersignature doctrine – which was at issue in the conflict between King and Cabinet in 1905, causing dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union – was enshrined in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway. While Norway has a written constitution, we also have constitutional convention.
The ultimatum in April of 1940 was on the 10th, not the 9th. As for the Royal Court’s position on the financial independence of the Royal House, an argument about it has been made, but it might not be an official opinion of the Royal Court, and if I were to write about it today, I would have double-checked it.
Minor language corrections have been made, including correcting original word choices that sound out of place. The argument and structure remain unaltered.
Republished on the eve of the centenary of the birth of Her Late Britannic Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.
In Defense of Constitutional Monarchy as Form of Government
It is commonly believed that the monarchic form of government is a thing of the past, of the times when the king ruled and the people were ruled. In those countries where the absolute monarch was not removed by a revolution, as time went by, the people were given more and more power, ending in a democracy, where those who are ruled are those who rule. In this common belief, the division of power between the people and a monarch necessarily is an intermediate state. That is a matter of opinion.
Formerly, it was common belief that government should be based on a contract between the ruler and the governed. Today, with the deployment of democracy, this belief suffers from the misconception that those who govern are those who are governed. Of course, the people do not need protection against themselves. However, most democracies today are more or less representative democracies, not direct democracies. Hence, the governed need protection against those who govern, namely the popular representatives. Moreover, in a democracy, the popular majority rules. Those who are governed are in fact lots of minorities. These minorities need protection.
An important principle in a modern government is the principle of popular sovereignty. However, this is not the only principle. At least as important is the principle of individual rights. I leave aside the discussion of what these rights are or should be. I merely determine that individual rights are a basic principle on which all forms of government should be based. The third principle is the principle of distribution of power. The purpose of this principle is to guarantee a free and secure society. The distribution of power is not only about separating government into an executive, a legislative, and a judicial branch. It is also about dividing power between different levels of government, e.g., between a federal level, a state level, and a local level. Also, it is about limiting the power of government as such, and it is about having correctives to popular power.
Having a hereditary monarch as a corrective to popular power guarantees that the basis of power of the legislative branch and the executive branch of government is different. The case of the bill on mandatory front-seat belts in cars in Norway illustrates the corrective role of the monarch quite well. The bill was disapproved by His Majesty King Olav V. His Majesty did not approve of his people being subjected to such an infringement of their freedom. The King's opinion was widely known. However, when the bill was presented to His Majesty for formal approval, it was not vetoed. This is most probably due to constitutional convention, which prevents the sovereign from interfering with government affairs. His Majesty continued opposing the law, however, by personally refusing to buckle up, under the protection of majestic impunity.
This is an example of how a monarch whose actual powers mostly have been removed can respond, and serve as a corrective to popular power. Furthermore, such a monarch can, e.g., give speeches in a very diplomatic form. Hence, he may exercise influence by gradually changing attitudes due to the respect he has amongst the people. Moreover, the monarch may have the role of meeting with his council, i.e., the cabinet, and he may have meetings with the premier. The influence of a respected monarch in such meetings should not be underestimated, although the politicians have the final say. Further, the monarch may act firmly in cases of the lack of willingness amongst politicians to form a cabinet. In such a situation he may appoint a cabinet of his own choosing. Further, on the 9th of April 1940, Norway was presented an ultimatum by Hitler's Germany. In this situation, His Majesty accepted that the actual authority was with the cabinet. However, His Majesty announced his abdication in case of an affirmative answer. Agreeing to such an ultimatum would be defying his mission in the service of the people. It is not highly unlikely that without this attitude of the monarch the cabinet would have taken the "easy way out". An elected head of state, often only holding this position for a few years, will rarely have the same level of conviction as a monarch whose life mission is serving his country and people as head. Last, it is worth mentioning that the Royal Norwegian Court considers His Majesty being financially independent of the Norwegian Government in a situation of crisis as essential.
As mentioned above, the influence of a monarch whose actual powers mostly have been removed cannot be underestimated. He can serve as an important bearer of attitudes. He can act in certain situations where politicians are unable to pull themselves together on their own. Also, the monarch may act if politicians attempt to undermine democracy itself. The King of Spain protected Spanish democracy against forces attempting to reinstall dictatorship. However, the corrective role of such a monarch is inadequate. Of course, a monarch must serve as a leader for the entire nation, securing stability, and must be above party politics. Being above party politics can easily be confused with letting politicians do whatever they please. These are two different things. Certainly, the business of a head of state includes the business of government. Being above party politics is about the manner in which one serves as a corrective. Also, the role of being a national leader for all can be combined with serving as a corrective. Consider again the case of the Norwegian seat belt regulations. His Majesty King Olav V hardly hurt his role as the common leader by opposing these regulations. I find it hard to believe that a veto would have made any considerable difference with regard to this role.
The parliamentary system, the concept that the cabinet must have the confidence of the legislature, is a grave defect. The concept is in effect a right for the majority party or coalition in the legislative body to place their people in the cabinet. This gives a poor system of checks and balances. Why the parliamentary system is established in European republics, as well as in monarchies, is not so understandable. The problem of vesting power in a non-elected person does after all not exist in republics.
The Swedish system is a monarchy, where the monarch has been deprived of all power, actual and formal. Sweden is a monarchy where the cabinet is formally appointed by the parliament. When one has already gone to this step, there should be no hindrance to taking it one step further, namely by having separate elections for the premier, who appoints the rest of the cabinet. In this way one may introduce more checks and balances whilst keeping dear traditions. However, the best course is to reintroduce power to the monarch, making him a corrective to the popular power.
A very understandable objection to a system with a monarch having actual power is his not being elected, more specifically his being born into his position. Of course, this is a serious disadvantage of monarchy. Nonetheless, I believe this is a price we have to pay to effectively limit the power of government. It is important to bear in mind that a monarch cannot so easily use any excuse for not complying with the contract between the ruler and the governed. Furthermore, in a constitutional monarchy the monarch is just one of several powers limited by a constitution.
Another objection against a monarchy is that the monarch may sit on the throne for quite some time, e.g., for 50 years. If the monarch is benevolent, this is all right. However, if the monarch is malevolent, this is a problem. An elected president can be removed from office through presidential elections. First of all, King George III was removed as king of the American colonies because of his abuse of power. So, it is not completely true that a malicious monarch cannot be removed. Second, as said before, a monarch in a constitutional monarchy will have limited powers. The judiciary and the legislature will effectively check and balance the powers of the monarch. Hence, a poor monarch will have limited possibilities of doing harm. Of course, he could neglect his duty as a corrective, but then again in effect that would be like having a figurehead.
Liechtenstein lies in the middle of Europe. The country calls itself a mix of democracy and monarchy. The ruling prince has actual powers guaranteed by the 1921 Liechtenstein constitution. The Prince of Liechtenstein has at least once turned down a bill that was both passed by Parliament and accepted in a popular vote. Liechtenstein is a shining example in Europe. Let's hope its form of government is not abolished.
Why aren't judicial power, defending the constitution with its declared rights, and political power enough as independent branches checking and balancing one another? Because no constitution, even if it were thicker than the Bible and however clever the amendment process might be, would alone be adequate for limiting the power of government. Isn't teamwork between the legislative and executive branch a prerequisite for an effective government? Of course, but, as said before, the point is limiting the power of government. Couldn't separate elections to the legislative and executive branches of government adequately divide power? Well, it most probably would help. However, government is not only about the rule of the popular majority. It is also about avoiding the tyranny of the popular majority. By having elections for both these branches, the popular majority decides who holds both the legislature and the executive office. The corrective to popular power is insufficient. 
J.K. Baltzersen is a Norwegian political commentator and writer. His work has appeared, among other places, in The Washington Times, FEE.org, and Enter Stage Right. He was formerly active in the Norwegian Federation of Conservative Students, in which capacity he had the original version of this article published.
